Despite the possibility of qualified-majority voting, member states in the Council of the European Union (EU) still adopt most policies by consensus. To address this puzzle, I
4
The remainder of this paper develops an agent-based model to formalize this argument and explores the model's empirical plausibility and theoretical implications. 7 In the next section, I present data on consensus decision-making in the Council of the EU and discuss several candidate explanations. Following the discussion of available data and theories, I present a brief case study of Council decision-making. The case description illustrates the type of coalition-building dynamics that the computational model aims to capture. It also demonstrates the plausibility of the assumptions made about member states' behaviour. Subsequently, I present the agent-based computational model and illustrate its dynamics through the description of a typical simulation run.
Next, the model's predictions of the aggregate consensus rate for different membership sizes are compared to the observed consensus rates in the Council of the EU. Despite the model's simplicity, it is not only able to reproduce the qualitative features of the data, that the rate of consensus decisions is relatively high and that the rate is insensitive to changes in the number of member states, but it also yields rather accurate quantitative predictions. Given these encouraging results, the last part of the analysis consists of a computational experiment to further investigate the effects of the voting threshold and the number of member states on the size of the typical winning 7 For recent applications of this modelling technology in Political Science, see for example Michael Laver and Ernest 5 coalition. The experiment shows that membership size does not have a discernible influence on winning coalition size, whereas the voting threshold displays a strong positive association. Finally, in the conclusion, I summarize the results and discuss the potential of competitive theory tests to rule out alternative explanations in future research. I also elaborate on the scope conditions of the theory to gauge the extent to which it is transferable to other collective decision-making contexts.
LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING IN THE COUNCIL OF THE EU
The constitutional rules of the EU allow the Council to adopt legislative decisions by a qualified majority of member states' votes, but explicit voting in general, and negative votes or abstentions in particular, are relatively rare. 8 Despite successive enlargements and re-definitions of individual voting weights, the qualified majority threshold has remained remarkably constant over time, varying only between 71% and 74%. Over this period of time, on average 82% of all legislative acts enacted during a particular year were adopted by consensus. Based on standard collective decision-making theories, we would expect to see less consensus decisions after increases in membership size, given that more member states with heterogeneous preferences need to be accommodated to reach unanimous agreement.
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Yet the observed rate of consensus decisions clearly contradicts this expectation, as it seems to be largely unaffected by changes in membership size.
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Figure 1 about here
Consensus decision-making in the Council has long been a puzzle and several explanations have been advanced to account for the lack of voting. First, the institutionalist explanation stresses the foresight of the Commission, its powers as agenda-setter in EU decision-making, and the configuration of member state preferences relative to the status quo. A peculiar feature of the EU is such statements to voice their discontent with aspects of the act. This study is interested in explaining why member states do not outvote each other even though the formal rules allow for the adoption of acts by majority vote. Thus, the appropriate dependent variable is member states' voting behaviour. Whether or not member states also choose to comment on their voting behaviour through formal statements is not relevant for answering this question. 7 that the Commission has the exclusive right to initiate legislation. Anticipating the positions of member states, the Commission might only introduce a proposal when a sufficient majority of member states exists to support the new policy.
14 As a result, only proposals with a relatively high chance of being adopted are actually discussed in the Council. The selection effect posited by this theory is in line with empirical evidence about the very low rejection rates of Commission proposals. 15 Although the Commission's role as agenda-setter and its strategic foresight might be able to account for why we see few rejected proposals, these elements of the theory are not sufficient to explain the relatively low number of negative votes on proposals that are actually adopted. Taking the preferences of governments into account, the Commission should be able to formulate a proposal that is just about acceptable to a minimum winning coalition of member states.
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In this scenario, oversized winning coalitions are only expected to occur if the disagreement between member states about the precise formulation of the new policy is small compared to their shared negative assessment of the existing status quo.
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Consensus decisions reflect a true agreement among member states about the undesirability of the status quo and the direction of policy change.
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In such a situation, the formal decision-making rule really does not matter; the same agreement could have been reached under unanimity.
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The second type of explanation highlights compliance concerns as possible explanation for consensus decision-making. The EU depends largely on member state governments and administrations for the transposition, implementation, and enforcement of European law. Member states that have been outvoted when the act was adopted might oppose 'through the backdoor' by delaying the act's implementation or by implementing it incorrectly.
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According to this view, laws are adopted by consensus at the European level to avoid compliance problems when those laws have to be put into force at the national level.
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The third type of explanation stresses the possibility of log-rolling between member states.
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If member states vary in the salience they attribute to 18 Situations in which such Pareto-improving policy changes are possible might be quite common in the EU. For example, Scharpf argues that decision-making on product-related regulations exhibits the strategic structure of a coordination game, in which member states agree that a uniform EU standard is preferable to the existing plethora of national standards. The Luxembourg compromise stipulated that unanimous agreement had to be reached, even in areas where qualified majority voting was formally allowed, if a member state felt that the decision affected important national interests. New entrants to Council negotiations are supposedly quickly initiated to and internalize this culture of compromise. Thus, according to this perspective, the lack of voting is due to internalized consensus norms.
While all discussed theories provide more or less plausible explanations for consensus decision-making, they all have trouble with the observation that the consensus rate remains largely constant despite a considerable increase in the number of member states in recent years. According Council of Ministers?', European Union Politics, 2 (2001) , 5-30; Thomas König and Dirk Junge, 'Why Don't Veto to the institutionalist perspective, more member states are likely to introduce more heterogeneous preferences. The increased disagreement should result in more negative votes and therefore a lower consensus rate. The larger numbers and increased preference heterogeneity through enlargement is also problematic for the compliance argument. The marginal returns for the majority of member states to accommodate yet another recalcitrant government arguably decrease with increases in the number of member states. An ambitious policy that is implemented imperfectly only in a small number of member states might be preferable to a completely watered down version, even if that version was uniformly applied across the Union. Regarding the logrolling explanation, the demands of vote trading on the cognitive abilities of negotiators increase exponentially with the number of member states. Vote trading amongst 25 member states is disproportionally harder and hence disproportionally less likely to be successful than vote trading amongst 15 member states. The expected outcome should again be a decrease in the consensus rate.
expectations. In contrast, the output of the computational model developed below is consistent with the observed pattern. Amongst the countries favouring a ban, Cyprus, Hungary, and Poland also embraced the Presidency's compromise proposal. Along the collection target dimension, Italy, Latvia, and the United Kingdom abandoned their call for a very low target rate in favour of the somewhat more ambitious goal of a nonlinear increase to 40% after 7 years.
As the lower right panel indicates, the end result of this process was three distinct, very similarly sized coalitions. As 90 votes are sufficient to block a Council decision, the consent of all three coalitions was required to adopt a decision. Therefore, the classic compromise outcome negotiated by ministers is not very surprising. In the end, member states agreed on an exemption of cordless power tools from the ban with a review of the exemption after four years. To make this solution acceptable to the proponents of a more encompassing ban, the Council's common position explicitly stated that the review should be conducted "with a view to the prohibition of cadmium in batteries" .
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Only Belgium and Ireland could not support this compromise and abstained from a vote. Belgium considered the partial cadmium ban not strict enough, while Ireland objected to the "closed" nature of the review of the exemption. The collection target was eventually set to 45%
after 10 years, a value located between the 40% and 60% originally demanded by the two groups of countries. Although the final outcome was closer to the position of its own coalition than to the position of the opposing coalition, Italy and Greece still considered these collection targets to be too high and abstained from the vote. At the core of the agent-based model lies a simple but empirically plausible assumption about individuals' behaviour. Negotiators are conceptualised as boundedly rational actors.
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Such actors are still goal-oriented; yet navigating in complex and uncertain environments, they rely on simple heuristics to pursue their goals rather than on complicated assessments of the consequences of 38 In this respect, the approach taken here is in no way different from more classical mathematical modelling, which usually aims to capture some empirical regularity or stylized fact about a political phenomenon. In the model, member states' ideal points are located in a two dimensional policy space, represented on a 21 x 21 square lattice. To make sure that simulation results do not depend on specific preference constellations, the integer coordinates for governments' ideal points are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from -10 to +10 at the beginning of the simulation run. The initial negotiation position corresponds to the ideal point of the government. states, which results in a predicted consensus rate that is up to nine per cent higher than the prediction of the base model, the predictions of the modified models generally lie within six percentage points of the predictions of the base model, and often considerably closer (see Table A2 in the online appendix). None of the qualitative results of this paper is dependent on the exclusion of voting weights from the model. 52 The online appendix presents replication results of models in which the sequence of moves is ordered according to voting weights and member states with smaller weights move before member states with larger ones. The predicted consensus rates change only marginally from those of the base model (i.e. by no more than three percentage points, see Table A2 ).
views. Thus, this outcome represents a broad compromise of all member states; in other words, it represents a consensus decision. the end of the run, and the median number of member states in the largest coalition at the end of the run. Finally, conditional on these characteristics, the run exhibits the median distance between member states' negotiation positions at the start of the simulation. The example run illustrates an important feature of the computational model. The stopping rules discussed above imply that the simulation does not stop until all member states are part of a blocking coalition, even when two or more already existing blocking coalitions are large enough to muster the required majority to adopt a decision by vote. The lower panels in Figure 3 illustrate this situation. The lower left panel depicts two large blocking coalitions, one with twelve and one with nine member states. In addition, two smaller coalitions consisting of one and three member states exist. If the two blocking coalitions agreed on a compromise, they could easily outvote the other member states. Only 18 votes are required for a winning majority. However, the model assumes that the coalition building continues until all member states are part of a blocking minority.
Consequently, the states of the two smaller coalitions are still able to join the blocking coalitions;
only then does the simulation stop.
At first sight, the implicit assumption that blocking coalitions 'wait' for the remaining states to become members of a blocking coalition before they negotiate a compromise amongst themselves seems to be inconsistent with the rational goal-orientation of actors. However, if the final compromise negotiated between blocking coalitions is at least somewhat affected by the coalition's respective sizes, drawing out the negotiation process to allow 'lonely' member states to join one's coalition is a very rational strategy. In the lower left panel of Figure 3 , the members of the blocking coalition closer to the three-member coalition have a clear incentive to prolong the negotiation process in order for the members of the smaller coalition to join them. Striking a bargain requires the consent of all negotiation parties, thus the refusal of one blocking coalition is sufficient to extent the negotiation process. As depicted in the lower right panel, the delay in accepting a compromise has increased the coalition size from nine to twelve member states.
Although the size of the larger blocking coalition has also increased by one member state during that time, the relatively stronger increase in the number of members of the smaller blocking coalition brought its size almost up to par and promises more leverage for extracting concessions.
As the focus of this study is on coalition formation and voting, the determination of the substantive negotiation outcome is not explicitly modelled. However, existing empirical research indicates that models based on weighted averages of member states' policy positions perform best in predicting actual decision-making outcomes in the Council.
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Thus, the assumption that larger coalitions are better able to tilt the negotiation outcome in their favour is empirically supported. If negotiators are aware of this advantage, they have every reason to delay an agreement until their coalition has reached the largest possible size. In this sense, negotiators do not only seek a coalition that is able to block legislation, but once this aim is achieved, also a coalition that is as large as possible to exert a maximum degree of influence on negotiation outcomes.
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION OF AGGREGATE MODEL OUTPUT
The previous section described the setup of the computational model and the rules according to which actors are supposed to behave. The illustrative simulation run showed the similarities of the resulting model dynamics with real-world coalition building processes. Thus, the microbehavioural rules provide an empirically plausible causal mechanism. This section assesses to what extent these micro-behavioural rules are also able to generate the empirically observed rate of consensus decision-making at the macro-level. Any plausible model should be able to reproduce the two qualitative features of the aggregate voting data presented in Figure 1 . First, the model should generate a generally high consensus rate: given the wide variation in consensus rates around the mean of 82%, a predicted rate between 74% and 90% would surely be acceptable. Second, the model's prediction should be relatively insensitive to the number of member states. analogous to the familiar R-squared measure in linear regression analysis can be calculated. The main difference of this PRE-measure to R-squared is that it uses the prediction of the null-model rather than the mean of the observed data as the baseline for calculating the reduction in error. The predictions of the computational model are generated without taking into account any empirical information about the observed consensus rates. Hence, using the mean of the actually observed 55 Figure 1 presents the same consensus rate data in the form of a time-series. Unfortunately, no voting records are available for the period prior to 1994. 56 The actual percentage voting threshold applied in the Council varied slightly during the observed time period.
However, these small changes in the formal voting threshold do not affect the effective voting threshold in terms of the number of member states required to form a winning coalition.
consensus rates as a baseline for comparisons with the purely theoretical predictions of the computational model would be inappropriate.
Figure 4 about here
The predicted consensus rates of the computational model are remarkably close to the observed consensus rates. During the nine years in which the EU consisted of 15 member states, the consensus rate varied between 74% and 97%. The computational model predicts a consensus rate of 85%, very similar to the observed time-average of 82%. Compared to the prediction of the null model of 50%, the prediction of the computational model reduces the prediction error by 96%.
During the three years in which the EU consisted of 25 member states, the consensus rate varied between 78% and 91%. Again, the computational model's predicted consensus rate of 85% is very close to the mean of the actually observed, yearly consensus rates of 86%. Compared to the nullmodel prediction, the prediction of the computational model reduces the prediction error by 97%.
Only the computational model's prediction for 12 member states is relatively far off from the observed data. The only available data point for 12 member states indicates a consensus rate of 75% in the year 1994, while the computational model predicts a consensus rate of 89%. Given the generally high variability of the consensus rate over time, the source for this lack of correspondence is not clear. The model might do a worse job in predicting the consensus rate when the number of member states is rather small, or the observed year might have had an unusually low consensus rate. Either way, even this worst prediction decreases the prediction error of the null-model by 68%. In total over the entire period, the model reduces the prediction error by 95%.
THE PREDICTED EFFECTS OF VOTING THRESHOLD AND MEMBERSHIP SIZE
The strong correspondence of the simulated coalition building dynamics and consensus rates with their real world equivalents warrant a further examination of the computational model. This section presents the results of a computational experiment. The goal of the experiment is to identify the consequences of changes in the voting threshold and the membership size on consensus decisionmaking. The dependent variable in this analysis is the size of the winning coalition as a percentage of member states, measured at the end of the simulation run. By systematically varying the voting threshold and the number of member states, the independent and interactive effects of these two independent variables on the size of the winning coalition can be discerned.
The number of member states is varied in the experiment from 6 to 30, resembling the actually observed range of the number of past, current, and potential future member states of the EU. The voting threshold is varied from 51% to 90%.
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For each combination of values of the independent variables, the simulation is run 1,000 times. For a given membership size, the use of an identical list of 1,000 random seeds to initiate the simulation ensures that the initial distribution of member states' ideal points is exactly the same for all voting thresholds. However, when membership size is varied, the distribution of member states' initial preferences cannot be the same, regardless of whether or not we keep the voting threshold constant. Still, the large number of of 91%). The total PRE value for the entire sample period is hardly affected by these modifications, always ranging between 94 and 96% (see Table A1 and Figures A1-A8 in the online appendix).
58 A voting threshold of 100% is not considered in the simulation because the results would be trivial. Under unanimity rule, each individual member state constitutes a blocking minority and therefore does not engage in coalition building.
Threshold values between 90% and 100% are also less interesting, as they do not occur in most real-world decisionmaking systems.
replications with randomly distributed ideal points ensures that the distribution of initial preferences of member states do not systematically affect those simulation results. The analysis above suggests that membership size has little effect on consensus decisionmaking, but that higher voting thresholds increase the likelihood that acts are adopted without contesting votes. To illustrate this effect, the consequences of future changes in the EU's voting threshold on the predicted consensus rate can be considered. In 2014, the new voting system introduced by the Lisbon treaty will come into force, reducing the primary voting threshold in the Council from 74 to 65%. According to the model, this 9 percentage point decrease in the voting threshold will result in a disproportionally large reduction in the rate of consensual decisions of 25 percentage points. While the predicted consensus rate for the current Nice treaty rules is 88%, the rate under the new Lisbon treaty rules is expected to decline to 63%, implying a considerable increase in the occurrence of explicit voting in the Council. quantitative predictions for the rate of consensus decisions also correspond well with the empirically observed rates. Importantly, the model is able to reproduce the observation of a largely constant consensus rate despite large increases in membership size during the study period. The model does not include any assumptions specifically incorporated to reproduce this feature of the observed rate, so this finding constitutes an important independent test of the theory. 61 The prediction of a stark decline in the consensus rate under the Lisbon treaty rules is not sensitive to the simplifying assumption of equal voting weights with a single majority threshold. See Table A2 and Figures We might be able to exclude some of these alternative theories purely on the ground that they are unable to generate the high consensus rates observed in the Council. Consensual Decisions (%) 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 Year where the number of trials is 1,000 and the probability of success is 0.5. 
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